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This paper develops a model of social interactions with endogenous association. People are assumed
to invest in relationships to maximize their utility. Even in a linear-in-means model, when associations
are endogenous, the effect of macro-group composition on behavior is non-linear and varies across
individuals. We also show that larger groups facilitate sorting. Using data on associations among high
school students, we provide a range of evidence consistent with our model. Individuals associate with
people whose behaviors and characteristics are similar to their own. This tendency is stronger in large
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Social Interactions and Endogenous Association 
I.  Introduction 
Social scientists have increasingly turned to social interactions models, in which 
peoples’ behaviors are affected by their social groups, to understand large disparities in 
behaviors and outcomes, and especially the low outcomes among underrepresented and 
economically disadvantaged groups.
1 Economists interested in social interactions have 
focused on controlling for the effect of selection into “macro-groups,” such as schools or 
neighborhoods, on estimates of social interactions.
2 While analogous forces presumably 
operate within these macro-groups, to the best of our knowledge this paper is the first to 
systematically study the effects of endogenous association within groups. The absence of 
work on this question is troublesome for, while selection into groups almost surely biases 
estimates of the effects of groups up, endogenous association within groups limits the 
interpretation of conventional estimates and means that they are almost surely biased 
down. If associations are endogenous, social groups will have non-linear effects and 
individual characteristics and group composition will interact in determining behavior, 
markedly changing the policy implications of social interactions models. 
This paper develops a formal model of within-group associations. We assume that 
individuals choose both their behavior and their associations to maximize their utility, 
which depends on both their own and their associates’ behaviors and characteristics. We 
specify a cost in terms of time and effort to an individual of associating with the other 
                                                 
1 See, for instance, Wilson [1987, 1996]; Massey and Denton [1993]; and Jargowsky [1997]. Early studies 
often contain weak controls for macro-group selection (Datcher [1982]; Corcoran, Gordon, Laren, and 
Solon [1992]).  
2 Recent attention has focused on controlling for macro-group selection. See surveys by Jencks and Mayer 
[1990]; Deitz [2002]; and Haurin, Deitz, and Weinberg [2002] and theoretical work by Bayer and Ross 
[2006]. More recent studies seek to identify random variation in social groups. Such studies include Bayer, 
Ross, and Topa [2004]; Bertrand, Luttmer, and Mullainathan [2000]; Borjas [1995]; Case and Katz [1990]; 
Cutler and Glaeser [1997]; Evans, Oates, and Schwab [1992]; Glaeser, Scheinkman, and Sacerdote [1996, 
2003]; Hoxby [2000]; Ioannides and Zabel [Forthcoming]; Solon, Page, and Duncan [2000]; Topa [2001]; 
Weinberg [2000] and studies in footnote 4.   2
members of his macro-group. We also assume and provide evidence that people obtain 
the most utility from associating with others whose behaviors and characteristics are 
similar to their own, known as homophily in sociology. 
We specify a model that yields the standard implication that behaviors depend 
linearly on the (weighted) average of the characteristics and actions of the other members 
of an individual’s macro-group, with the weights in our model determined by the amount 
of their interaction. Even with this linear behavioral model, when associations are 
endogenous, macro-group composition has a non-linear effect on behavior and the effect 
of macro-groups varies with individual characteristics and behaviors.
3 These non-
linearities arise when associations are endogenous because associates’ behaviors and 
characteristics will be non-linear functions of own characteristics. To the best of our 
knowledge, we are the first to generate these non-linearities endogenously. We apply our 
model to understand association patterns in schools. In that context, students who are 
inclined to substance use, for instance, in a school-grade where few other students are 
inclined toward substance use will be forced to associate with people who do not use 
substances, discouraging their own tendency to substance use. As the number of students 
inclined to substance use increases, these individuals will find more like-minded 
associates accentuating their tendencies. 
At a policy level, these non-linearities and interactions imply that even in a linear-
in-means model, social interactions are not zero-sum. To reduce the amount of a 
particular behavior, one would want to avoid placing people who are prone to that 
behavior in groups where there are many similar people – in these groups, there will be 
enough other people inclined toward the behavior with whom to associate to generate a 
                                                 
3 Krivo and Peterson [1996]; Galster, Quercia, and Cortes [2000]; Galster [2002]; and Weinberg, Reagan, 
and Yankow [2004]; and Burke and Sass [2006] provide evidence for non-linear effects and interactions. 
Non-linear effects have been argued for at least since Crane [1991], although there are few formal micro-
models of these effects (Quercia and Galster [Forthcoming] discuss theories).   3
high level of the behavior. In terms of estimation, these non-linearities also provide a 
potential solution to Manski’s [1993] reflection problem that is quite different from 
existing solutions (Brock and Durlauf [2001a,b]; Lee [2006]; Blume and Durlauf [2005]; 
Lin [2005]; and Shang [2006]). 
Many studies of social interactions exploit relocations of individuals across 
macro-groups.
4 Most such studies involve relocating individuals who are at-risk along 
some dimensions from social groups where many individuals are at risk to social groups 
with a mix of people who are and are not at risk. These studies find surprisingly small 
effects of social groups. Our model provides an explanation for these small effects. It 
indicates that individuals relocated in this way will tend to re-segregate within their new 
groups, attenuating any benefits, even if associates do have effects. Consistent with this 
hypothesis, Angrist and Lang [2004] and Kling, Ludwig, and Katz [2005] find larger 
effects for girls than boys, who may integrate more into their new social groups, and 
Clampet-Lundquist, Edin, Kling, and Duncan [2005] provide evidence that the difference 
is due to differences in integration into new neighborhoods.  
Emerging studies show that the associations that arise within macro-groups are 
not random, but empirical work on social interactions has not taken account of these 
results.
5 Most studies relate an individual’s behavior to the mean in his macro-group, 
implicitly assuming that all members of the macro-group interact equally.
6 Some 
                                                 
4 Studies include Plotnick and Hoffman [1995]; Ladd and Ludwig [1997]; Aaronson [1998]; Rosenbaum, 
DeLuca, and Miller [1999]; Katz, Kling, and Liebman [2001]; Ludwig, Duncan, and Hirschfield [2001]; 
Sacerdote [2001]; Oreopoulos [2003]; Zimmerman [2003]; Gould, Lavy, and Passerman [2004a, 2004b]; 
Jacob [2004]; Weinberg, Reagan, and Yankow [2004]; Kling; Ludwig; and Katz [2005]; and Angrist and 
Lang [2004]. 
5 A number of papers show that people prefer to associate with others of the same racial, ethnic, or 
religious group (Moody [2001]; Bayer, McMillan, and Rueben [2002]; Marmaros and Sacerdote [2003]; 
Bisin, Topa, and Verdier [2004]; Mayer and Puller [2006] see, however, Ross [2003]). People who are 
different from their macro-groups are less likely to be impacted by them (Duncan, Connell, and Klebanov 
[1997]; DiPasquale and Kahn [1999], Cummings, DiPasquale, and Kahn [2001]; Conley and Topa [2001]; 
and Hoxby [2000]). 
6 Exceptions are Conley and Udry [2001] and Bandiera and Rasul [2002] and Foster [2006]. Bertrand, 
Luttmer, and Mullainathan [2002], Munschi [2002], Grodner and Kniesner [2006]; and Hoxby and   4
theoretical analyses allow for variations in associations within macro-groups. Anselin 
[1988]; Lee [2001]; Brock and Durlauf [2001a, 2001b] specify a fixed weighting matrix 
that gives association patterns. This approach ignores that interactions are determined by 
behaviors as much as behaviors are determined by interactions (Coleman [1961]; 
Wiseman [2002]; and Eder [2003] provide vivid examples). A person who does not 
smoke, for instance, is unlikely to choose to associate with someone who smokes heavily, 
and so the first person’s smoking is unlikely to be much affected by the other person’s 
smoking. Weighting-matrix studies provide no guidance as to who a newly added person 
will associate with, nor do they indicate how adding or removing people affects the 
associations of people who are already in the macro-group and remain in it (Sobel [2001] 
makes these points in a particularly striking form). This gap is troublesome given that 
most policies to address the effects of social interactions involve moving people across 
macro-groups. 
This study employs data from the National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent 
Health (Add Health), which surveyed all students in 172 schools, asking about the 
respondents’ closest friends as well as their background and behaviors. We provide a 
range of evidence consistent with our model of endogenous association. We find that the 
majority of variation in friend’s behaviors and characteristics arises within grades in 
schools. Individuals associate with others whose behaviors and characteristics are similar 
to their own. Consistent with our model, we find that so long as there are a few people 
with a particular characteristic in a group, people with that characteristic associate with 
each other, and that people avoid associating with people who are different from 
themselves until most of the group is comprised of people who are different. We show 
                                                                                                                                                 
Weingarth [2006] use information to specify the group across interactions operate. Conley and Topa 
[2001] estimate propensities for racial groups to interact using a structural model. These papers do not 
explicitly study the association process, nor do they study how association-patterns are affected by changes 
in the population or in the behaviors of group members.   5
that group size facilitates segregation and show that there is a stronger relationship 
between own characteristics and associates’ characteristics in large macro-groups. 
While estimating the effect of endogenous sorting on behaviors is complicated, 
we provide evidence that endogenous association affects behavior. As indicated, our 
model implies that the availability of some like-minded individuals permits people to 
associate with people with the same behavioral tendencies, accentuating their own 
behavioral tendencies. Consistent with this implication, we show the mean behavior 
among the associates of people who are inclined to a particular behavior (based on their 
exogenous characteristics) is higher (relative to people whose characteristics imply that 
they are unlikely to have high levels of the behavior) in groups where there some people 
inclined to the same behavior. We also show that the availability of people who are 
inclined to a particular behavior increases the behaviors of people who are inclined to 
that behavior (relative to people whose characteristics imply that they are unlikely to 
have high levels of the behavior). Lastly, we provide some two-stage least squares 
estimates of the effect of associates’ behaviors on own behavior. 
II. A Model 
II.A. The Framework 
This section develops a model of social interactions with endogenous association. 
People are characterized by observable characteristics, x, and an shock, ε . They choose 
an action, y, and a set of associations. An individual with characteristic x and shock ε  
who takes action y has a utility of, 
{
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This utility function has three components: a private utility; a cost of interacting; and a 
social utility, each of which is described in turn. Variables with over-bars and A-
superscripts denote means among a person’s associates ( 
2 A y  denotes the mean of the   6
squared values of associates’ actions). 
In the empirical analysis, we consider a variety of actions and outcomes. The 
actions include substance use and behavioral problems. We also study grades, which 
depend on own actions, whose utility depends on associates’ actions, and on associates’ 
grades (if there are human capital spillovers). The private utility is written to imply that 
behavior is a linear function of characteristics. 
Interactions can be costly in terms of time and effort. To capture these costs 
parsimoniously, we assume that people incur a cost, c, per unit of time spent interacting 
with others, where  () y x T , ,ε  denotes the total time that the person spends interacting 
with others.
7 We assume that associations are binary. Because of random encounters, 
people are assumed spend  N t0  “passively associating” with every other member of 
their macro-group. Here N gives the size of the macro-group, so total passive associations 
do not depend on group size. People can also “actively associate” with particular 
members of their macro-group, spending an additional unit of time for a total of 
N t0 1+ . 
The social utility has both standard and novel components. In Manski’s [1994] 
terminology, θ  and γ  give the effect of others’ behaviors (the “endogenous effect”) and 
characteristics (the “exogenous effect”). The parameters ψ , ω , and Φ have no 
counterparts in Manski’s framework, because they do not affect the action directly. They 
affect the utility of associations and actions through their effect on associations. High 
values of ψ  reduce the utility of associating with people with extreme values of y. The 
parameter ω  allows the utility of associating with someone to vary with the other 
person’s behavior, y, and for the effect to depend on a person’s own characteristics. For 
instance, people with behavioral problems, may produce disutility. The parameter Φ is 
                                                 
7 The cost could be negative if the opportunity cost of time is low and people like interacting.   7
analogous, but reflects the effect of associates’ characteristics on the utility of 
associating. For instance, people likely obtain utility from associating with people who 
are attractive or athletic and people of the same race or ethnicity. 
Once people are viewed as choosing to associate with a portion of their groups, it 
becomes important to consider how the number of associates affect the strength of 
interactions, which is governed by α . One view, which comes closest to the literature, is 
that new associations completely crowd out existing ones, leaving the total effect of 
associates fixed, that  0 = α . One might think that people who have many associates are 
affected by their associates (as a whole) more than people with few associates, that 
0 > α . To simplify notation, it is convenient to define  α γ − =1  and 
a A A
T z z ≡ , which 
is the mean of some variable z among a person’s associates weighted by the total amount 
of interactions, T. 
II.B. Solving the Model 
Differentiation with respect to y gives the person’s optimal action, 
( ) ε γ θ β
α + + + ′ = T x y x y
A A .   (*) 
This is the standard linear-in-means behavioral equation, where the strength of the social 
effect varies across people if  0 ≠ α . We consider a model with a binary, scalar 
characteristic. (Weinberg [2005] discusses a model with continuous characteristics.) We 
begin by eliminating the action to focus on associations on characteristics. We assume 
that the characteristic takes on values  { } 1 , 1 − ∈ x , and refer to people with these 
characteristics as low and high types. Let  i π  denote the share of the group with 
{} 1 , 1 − ∈ = i x . We assume  1 = Φ  and that the other social utility parameters (θ, ψ, ω, and 
γ) are all zero. 
Let  [] i
A
j i π π , 0 | ∈  denote the measure of people with characteristic  i x  with whom a 
person with characteristic  j x  associates, which must be non-negative and is constrained   8
by group compostion. With  0 > Φ  and the values of the characteristic taking on opposite 
signs, people only associate with people of the same type, so that a type-i  person chooses 
[] i
A
i i π π , 0 | ∈ . The first order condition for active associations is, 
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Figure 1 illustrates the associations of a high (the results for lows are reversed). 
Panel A shows the “desired” value of 
A









 ignoring the group 
composition constraint that  H
A
H H π π ≤ | , as a function of  H π . It is possible to show that 
the desired 
A
H H| π  is non-increasing (and decreasing if  1 < α ) in  H π . The figure also 
shows a 45º line, which gives the maximum feasible value of 
A
H H| π . Up to three regions 
may be present. In region 1, the desired active associations exceed the maximum possible 
given the population composition. In the second region, the composition constraint does 
not bind and active associations are positive. In the third region, the person chooses not 
to actively associate. As the bold curve in the figure shows, active associations increase 
in region 1; decrease in region 2; and are zero in region 3. To fully characterize the 
model, the figures show all three regions, but the third may be less relevant, than the 
others especially with sorting on multiple dimensions. 
Panel B shows 
A
H x , where 
A
i x  denotes the value of 
A
x  among type i people, as a 









 shows the desired value of 
A
x . It is 
possible to show that this curve is non-decreasing and concave (when  ) 1 < α . Intuitively, 
when more of the group is high, a greater share of passive associations will be with highs, 
which decreases highs’ motivation to actively associate with other highs (so long as 
1 < α ) partially, but not fully, offsetting the increase in 
A
x . Also shown are the   9
maximum value of 
A
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x ,  which is concave if  1 < α , and the value that 
emerges in the absence of active associations,  ( ) [ ]
α π π 0 1 t x x L H H H − + , which is linear. 
The bold curve shows that 
A
H x  increases monotonically, with the greatest increase at low 
levels (in region 1). 
Except on the left (and extreme right), changes in group composition have less 
effect on highs’ associates than implied by the average characteristics in the group (given 
by the diagonal line from () L x , 0  to ( ) H x , 1 . This concavity, which is present except in 
region 3, is the key to our results. 
Panel C shows that the difference in 
A




H x x − , is 
hump-shaped in  H π . Intuitively, in groups that are largely composed of one of the 
groups, there is little scope for sorting, so the associations of both types are relatively 
similar. Segregation is greatest when there are many members of both groups. 
II.C. Group Size 
A novel implication of our model is that sorting should be greater in large groups 
than in small groups. Panel A of Figure 2 shows that increasing group size reduces the 
desired level of 
A
H H| π . This can be seen from  (**) where N and 
A
i i| π only appear 
multiplicatively, so as N increases, the same social influence can be obtained with a 
proportionately lower level of 
A
H H| π . Panel B shows that 
A
H x  increases in region 1 and is 
otherwise unchanged (the increase in N corresponds to more associations in region 1, but 
is offset by the decrease in 
A
H H| π  in region 2). Increasing group size shifts the 
Max A
x  
curve up because the amount of weight placed on passive associations does not change, 
but for any given level of  H π , there are more highs with whom other highs can associate.  10
The model implies more sorting in large groups when either group’s associations are 
constrainted. 
Glaeser, Sacerdote, and Scheinkman [1996] and Graham [2005] estimate the 
strength of social interactions using variations across large groups or variations in group 
size. Insofar as large groups facilitate sorting one might expect more variation in large 
groups. Endogenous association likely biases estimates using Glaeser, Sacerdote, and 
Scheinkman’s method upward, but estimates using Graham’s method downward.
8 At a 
policy level, our results on macro-group size indicate that attempts to integrate people 
from different groups will be more successful if macro-groups are kept small, limiting 
peoples’ ability to re-segregate within groups. 
II.D. Crowding Out 
As indicated, once the number of associations is endogenous, one needs to think 
about how the number of associates someone has affects the strength of the social 
influence he experiences. By focusing on associates’ means, existing models implicitly 
assume that additional associations fully crowd out existing ones ( 0 = α ), but it seems 
likely that people with more associates will be affected by them more. 
It is possible to show that decreasing crowding out increases the difference in the 
mean associations between highs and lows. This effect is particularly large when most of 
the group is made up of one type or the other and in the middle. Thus, the assumption of 
complete crowding out, which is implicit in the literature, limits the scope for people to 
segregate within their macro-groups by active associating. 
II.E. Endogenous Actions 
So far we have considered models with sorting on exogenous characteristics. This 
section focuses on a binary action,  { } 1 , 1 − ∈ y , assuming that people derive utility from 
associating with people taking the same action ( 0 > θ ). (For simplicity, we assume that  11
the other social utility parameters, ψ, Φ, ω, and γ, are zero.) Conditional on the 
distribution of actions, sorting on an endogenous behavior is identical to sorting on an 
exogenous characteristic. 
Characterizing the equilibrium involves solving for the share of the group taking 
an action as a function of the distribution of exogenous characteristics in the group. A 
person with characteristic  i x  takes action  H y  if, 
L
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* * ε β ε + ′ − ≡ i i x  
denote the value of ε at which a person with  0 = x  or  i x x =  is indifferent between the 
actions. For simplicity, we again assume that  { } 1 , 1 − ∈ i x . The probability that a person 
with characteristic  i x  takes the low (high) action is  ( )
*
| i i L F ε ρ ≡  ( ( )
*
| 1 i i H F ε ρ − ≡ ), 
where  () . F  denotes the cumulative distribution function of ε. 
Let () H L H H H H H π ρ π ρ ρ − + = 1 | |  denote the share of the group taking the high 
action, where  H π  denotes the share of the group with the high characteristic. The effect 
of  H π  on the mean action can be calculated by differentiating this expression with 
respect to  H π  and rearranging. Formally, 
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π π . 
If there is some crowding out, if people choose to actively associate, and if 






 will be negative, so that as more of 
the group is high, more people take the high action, and that it will be more negative 
when  H ρ  (and  H π ) are either low or high.







 will be large 
because its denominator will be small, so that changes in the share of highs in the group 
will have a particularly large effect on mean behavior. 
Figure 3 shows the share of the group and people with the high and low 
characteristic taking the high action as a function of the share of the group with the high 
characteristic and the share of the group with the high action assuming that ε is 
distributed uniformly with bounds such that people are always in the interior of the 
support. This assumption is appealing because it implies that behaviors are linear in 
characteristics and associations. In both panels, the share of each type taking the high 
action is non-linear. The steeper sections at low and high levels emerge because at low 
levels, introducing a few highs makes it possible for highs to find like-minded associates, 
while at the high end, eliminating the few remaining highs makes it impossible for lows 
to find like-minded associates. 
                                                 
9 Under these assumptions, the first term is negative and more negative whenever either of the groups has 
fewer active associations, which will be at extreme values of  H ρ  (and  H π ). The second and third terms 
are zero whenever people’s active associations are unconstrained or zero and negative when the constraint 
i
A
i i π π ≤ |  binds, which will be at extreme values of  H ρ  (and  H π ). As 
A
i i| π  increases, these terms become  13
While the uniform case is useful for demonstrating that the model generates non-
linearities endogenously, it is probably more realistic to assume that the shock, ε, is 
normally distributed. In this case, it is possible to show that the gap in both behaviors and 
associations between people with the high and low characteristic are hump-shaped in the 
share of the group with the high characteristic.
10 
Figure 4 shows results for normally distributed shocks. The difference in the 
action between people with the high and low characteristic is increasing in the share of 
the group that has the high characteristic and the share of the group with the high action. 
The relationship between the average behavior in the population and the share of the 
group with the high characteristic is non-linear, convex at low levels and concave at high 
levels. The difference in the mean behavior of the associates of people with the high and 
low characteristic are also hump-shaped in the share of the group with the high 
characteristic (and the high behavior). These implications are tested below. 
                                                                                                                                                 
less negative, so these terms are also most negative at extreme values of  H ρ  (and  H π ). 
10 Define  L H H H H | | ρ ρ ρ − = ∆  as the difference in behavior between people with the high and 
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 is negative and more negative at low and high values of  H ρ . Because 
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* * ' ' H L F F ε ε −  is negative when  H ρ  is low (and 
* ε  is high) and it is positive when  H ρ  
is high (and 
* ε  is low). Thus,  H ρ ∆  is increasing when  5 . < H ρ  and decreasing when  5 . > H ρ  and the 
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shaped in  H ρ . Given that  H ρ ∆  is hump-shaped in  H ρ , so is 
A
y ∆ . Note that these results hold for any 
distribution where  ( ) ( ) ( )
* * ' ' H L F F ε ε −  is negative when 
* ε  is high positive when 
* ε  is low, including a 
uniform distribution where people move beyond the support.  
  14
II.F. Implications 
A number of important implications arise immediately from the non-linear 
relationship between group composition and behavior. First, it breaks the zero-sum 
implication of the standard, linear-in-means model. A number of studies across a range of 
disciplines have argued for a non-linear relationship between group composition and 
behavior (see footnote 3 for references). To the best of our knowledge, our model is the 
first to generate non-linearities endogenously. 
In the preceding uniform example, if one quarter of the population had the high 
characteristic and the population was large enough for three groups, if the highs were 
divided equally among the three groups, 30.9% of the population (68.4% of highs and 
18.4% of lows) would take the high action. If the population were divided into 2 groups 
with no highs and one that was three quarter highs, 23.0% of the population (81.6% of 
highs; none of the lows with other lows, and 31.6% of the lows in the three-quarter high 
group) would take the high action. Thus, grouping the highs with enough other highs to 
allow them to heavily associate with each other generates high overall behavior. 
The existing literature places particular emphasis on the multipliers generated 
when peoples’ actions depend on the actions of the other people in their social groups. 
The strength of these endogenous effects is not identified in the traditional linear-in-
means model of social interactions because the expected behavior of associates is a linear 
function of associates’ observable characteristics (see Manski [1994]; Brock and Durlauf 
[2001a,b]; Blume and Durlauf [2006]; Lin [2005]; Lee [2006]; and Shang [2006]). 
Endogenizing associations overturns these results in two ways. First, the non-
linear relationship between the composition of a group and the mean behavior can, in 
principle, identify the model’s parameters. Second, the distinction between traditional 
endogenous and exogenous effects itself becomes less interesting once associations are 
treated as endogenous because changes in the distribution of exogenous characteristics  15
can generate multipliers through associations. Put differently, for multipliers to arise 
some endogenous variable has to respond to changes in the environment, and it can be 
associations instead of behaviors. 
Lastly, endogenous association limits the interpretation of conventional estimates 
of the effects of macro-groups because the effect of macro-groups varies across people 
and with group composition. While one can accurately estimate the effect of moving 
people like those being studied between groups like those studied, it is impossible to 
estimate the effect of moving similar people between different types of groups or 
different types of people between the groups being studied. Put differently, one can 
estimate the effect of the groups studied on the people studied, but there is no single 
“effect” of groups to estimate because the effect of groups depends on associations which 
in turn depend on interactions between individual characteristics and group composition. 
As indicated, moving people who are at risk along some dimension from groups where 
many individuals are at risk to groups with a mix of people who are and are not at risk is 
likely to have less effect on the influences a person experiences than one would expect 
based on macro-group composition because people can find like-minded associates in 
their new groups. 
II.G. Actions and Characteristics Directly Affect Interactions 
Some behaviors inherently generate utility for one’s associates, while others 
generate disutility. For instance, it may be enjoyable to associate with people who party, 
but unpleasant to associate with people with behavioral problems. People will associate 
with people taking actions that generate utility for their associates, causing those actions 
to proliferate if  0 > θ . 
It can be shown that people associate more with people taking high levels of 
pleasant actions, causing those actions to spread. By contrast, people tend to avoid people 
taking high levels of unpleasant actions, which will reduce the amount of those actions. It  16
is well known that actions for which θ  is high will spread, but these results imply that for 
a given value of θ , actions for which ω  is high will spread too. 
II.H. Peer Pressure 
People often describe social interactions models as models of “peer pressure.” 
Peer pressure involves the withdraw of association when one person takes an action that 
produces disutility for another. To model peer pressure, associations must be 
endogenous. 
To capture this idea, we assume that people derive utility directly from having 
people associate with them and, in choosing their actions, take into consideration how 
their action will affect whether other people associate with them. Let the utility function 
be, 
{
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where P gives the person’s popularity, the number of people associating with him. 
Returning to the case of a continuous action, the first order condition for the action is, 
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y
P
T x y x y
A A .   (*’) 
The condition now includes a term for the effect of a change in the action on the measure 
of people who will associate with him. Under peer pressure, a person’s action depends on 
the density of people at the margin to interact with him as well as the mean of associates’ 
behaviors and characteristics. In this sense, the standard linear-in-means model of 
interactions may be a poor representation of peer pressure. 
The strength of “reception” and “transmission” of peer pressure will likely 
depend on characteristics. On the reception-side, insofar as most people in the macro-
group will want to associate with them regardless of their actions, people whose 
characteristics make them appealing as associates will be less subject to peer pressure  17
than others. People whose characteristics make them very undesirable as associates may 
also be less subject to peer pressure insofar as few people will associate with them 
regardless of their actions. Thus the model suggests that the extent to which people are 
subject to peer pressure as recipients follows an inverse-U in how appealing they are as 
associates. On the transmission-side, people who are attractive as associates may get 
more weight in other people’s P’s, so people will be particularly subject to peer pressure 
from attractive people. The strength of peer pressure from the transmission side will be 
strictly increasing in how appealing someone is as an associate. 
II.I. Extensions 
This section considers two further extensions to the model – endogenous 
popularity and dislike. One could extend the analysis of popularity by making one of the 
individual characteristics, x, be the measure of people in the macro-group who associate 
with a person. Presumably, people obtain more utility from interacting with people who 
are popular. In the context of peer pressure, people will be particularly interested in 
having popular people associate with them. 
When popularity has effects, an intervention that increases the weight placed on 
one person or set of people will generate a feedback to other people in the macro group, 
which can generate multipliers – as one person begins to associate with a person that 
raises the utility that others derive from associating with him. Such an effect explain the 
emphasis placed on affecting how much weight people place on others, by making 
positive (or negative) examples of people, such as valedictorians (Moffitt [2001] 
discusses a variety of policies). 
Lastly, one might allow people to invest time down-weighting some members of 
their macro-group. People would optimally want to down-weight people who are most 
different from them. Without crowding out, people who are most different from their 
macro-groups will invest the most to down-weight others. The possibility of down- 18
weighting reduces the benefits from placing people with bad outcomes into better groups. 
III. Data 
We use data from the National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent Health, 
commonly known as Add Health. The Add Health data provide information on a wide 
range of youth behaviors, including substance use, risky behaviors, grades, and 
behavioral problems, and data on family background. They contain nationally 
representative data on 90,118 students enrolled in grades 7-12 in 172 schools. Students 
were asked about their 5 closest male and female friends, so information is available on 
both the macro groups – schools and grades – as well as the subgroupings that emerge 
within them. Also, all people are surveyed symmetrically.
11 
We restrict attention to students enrolled in 9
th through 12
th grades in classes with 
at least 10 students. The data contain a limited panel aspect, which we do not utilize. 
Appendix Table 1 lists the behaviors and outcomes used and their construction. In 
most cases variables were given as the frequency of a behavior. In these cases, we coded 
them so as to give a monthly frequency. 
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics.
12 Slightly under half the sample is male; 
16% identify as black (respondents were allowed to report multiple races); 15% identify 
as Hispanic. Just over three quarters of respondents live with their father, and their 
mothers have 13.6 years of schooling on average. Average grades vary from a B- to a B, 
with the lowest grades in math and the highest grades in history and social studies. On 
average the respondents smoked a bit more than once a week, they drink a couple of 
times a month, and get drunk about half as frequently. The most common behaviors or 
                                                 
11 Alternative surveys provide information about particular individuals and ask the respondents about the 
behaviors of their friends. Under this approach less information is available on friends than on respondents 
and reports of friends’ behavior may be biased differently than reports of own behavior. 
12 The original sample comprises 90,118 individuals. Once the sample is restricted to individuals in grades 
9 through 12 with valid school, grade, and identification information, the sample is reduced to 62,203. 
Restricting the sample to people with some identifiable friends with valid information reduces the sample 
to 47,570. The remaining deletions are for having missing data for a variety of the other variables.  19
behavioral problems are having trouble paying attention and doing homework regularly. 
Skipping school and fighting are the least common, occurring about once a month. 
Also shown are the means and standard deviations of the associate averages of the 
behaviors and characteristics. The mean of the associates’ behaviors are above the mean 
of own behaviors, indicating that people with “worse” behavior are listed as friends more 
often than people with better behavior. On the other hand, the mean of associates’ grades 
tend to be slightly higher than own grades, indicating that popularity is increasing in 
grades. Similarly, the mean of mother’s education and father present among associates is 
above the own mean for these variables, indicating that children with “better” family 
backgrounds may be more appealing because they are wealthier or more socially adept. 
IV. Within-Group Variations in Associations 
As indicated, most studies of social effects focus on variations across macro-
groups. We begin by investigating how much of the variation in friend’s behaviors and 
characteristics arises within macro-groups as opposed to between macro-groups.  
Meaningful macro-groups should be reasonably narrowly defined yet contain a 
large portion of peoples’ associates. School-grades meet this criterion with 74% of the 
surveyed friends being in the person’s school-grade. 
Let  ij z  denote a behavior or characteristic of the jth friend of person i. The mean 








, where  i N  gives the number of 
people with whom i is friends. (Here and below, by studying 
A
i z  we implicitly focus on 
the case where  0 = α ; work that estimates α  is in progress.) We decompose the variance 
of  i z  into within and between school-grade components. The total variance in 
A
i z  is 








i G S z E VAR G S z E z VAR z VAR , , + − = . The former term represents the 
within school-grade variance and the later the across school-grade variance. 
The share of the variance arising within school-grades is the 
2 R  from an analysis  20
of variance with a full set of school-grade interactions, which is reported the first column 
of Table 2. The estimates indicate that for most behaviors over 90% of the variation in 
friends’ behaviors arises within school-grades. For grades (and television watching) 
about 80% of the variation in friends’ behaviors and outcomes arises within school 
grades. Between 75% and 90% of the variation in family background, measured by 
mother’s education, mother is a homemaker, and father’s presence arises within school-
grades. Considerably more of the variation in the racial and ethnic composition of friends 
can be accounted for by school-grade effects, frequently close to half, which is to be 
expected given the extent of racial and ethnic residential sorting. 
Because people often form friendships with people who live near them, a portion 
of the within school-grade variation likely arises from residential sorting among students 
in the same school-grade. Tracking and selection into classes may also generate within 
school-grade variations in associations. The Add Health survey does not contain data on 
tracking or the classes taken, but it does contain characteristics of the census block group 
of residence for a portion of respondents. Because neighborhood characteristics are only 
available for one respondent in five, column 3 reports the 
2 R  from the analysis of 
variance described above when applied to the smaller sample; column 4 reports results 
when the neighborhood variables interacted with school effects are added to the model. 
Switching to the smaller sample tends to increase the 
2 R  slightly because the 
sample size declines dramatically relative to the number of effects. Inclusion of 
neighborhood variables typically accounts for 5% of the variance in friends’ behavior. 
Even in this smaller sample with neighborhood variables, within macro-group variations 
account for 80% or more of the variation in associates’ behaviors; 30%-70% of the 
variations in associates’ race and ethnicity; and 70% of the variation in associates’ grades 
and family background. To the extent that people choose their friends based on their 
behaviors and there is an association between neighborhoods and behaviors, these  21
estimates will overstate the effect of residential proximity. 
The substantial variations in associates’ behaviors can not be viewed as the effect 
of sorting insofar as exogenous variations in associations combined with social effects on 
behavior will generate variations in associates’ behaviors. Nevertheless, we find 
substantial variations in associates’ family backgrounds within macro-groups, and these 
variations are not caused by associations. Regardless of causality, our estimates indicate 
ignoring variations in associations with macro-groups leads to substantial mis-measuring 
the social influences to which people are exposed. 
V. The Choice of Associates 
The preceding analysis indicates that the vast majority of variation in the 
composition of social groups arises within narrowly-defined macro-groups. We begin by 
studying the determinants of associations on exogenous characteristics (race, ethnicity, 
and family background). It is easier to study sorting on exogenous characteristics than 
behaviors and outcomes because, as indicated, if social interactions operate, behaviors 
and outcomes are affected by others. That is, the relationship between a person’s 
behavior and those of his associates may reflect the effect of his behavior on his 
associates as opposed to the effect of selective association. Our results on sorting on 
exogenous characteristics are of interest in their own right insofar as sorting on racial, 
ethnic, and socio-economic lines at the formative ages studied here likely affects attitudes 
toward other groups. 
V. A. Own Characteristics and Associates’ Characteristics 
We begin by regressing the mean of associates’ characteristics on own 
characteristics. Let  i x  denote a characteristic of person i. We regress the mean x among 
i’s associates, 
A
i x , on  i x  and anticipate a positive relationship. Our model is 
i i i i
A
i SG X x x ε γ φ + Π + + = . 
Person i’s own observable characteristics,  i X  (other than  i x ), are included as controls.  22
Also included are fixed effects fully interacting school and grade,  i SG . With these 
school-grade effects, we estimate whether people with higher levels of x have associates 
with higher values of x compared to others in the same school-grade. 
The estimates reported in Table 3 indicate a strong positive relationship between 
own characteristics and those of peoples’ associates. There are a number of reasons to be 
careful about interpreting these estimates as the causal effect of a person’s characteristics 
on his associations. As discussed above, the estimated relationships may reflect sorting in 
other arenas such as neighborhoods. Moreover, our model implies that people will 
selectively associate based on behaviors as well as characteristics. If groups have 
different behaviors and this form of sorting is present, our estimates will reflect the effect 
of sorting on behaviors that are affected by the characteristics. 
To address neighborhood-based selection, we augment our models by including 
neighborhood characteristics. The remaining columns of the table report estimates from 
the original specification for the sample with neighborhood characteristics and then 
estimates that include the neighborhood variables. The substantial reduction in the 
sample reduces the precision of the estimates, but neither the change in sample, nor the 
inclusion of the neighborhood variables substantially affects the point estimates. 
Lastly our estimates here and below can not rule out the possibility of a hierarchy 
among groups. For instance, everyone may prefer to associate with white students, but 
because the white students associate with each other, students from other groups may be 
forced to associate with each other. Even in this context our estimates show active 
associations among white students. 
V. B. Macro-Group Composition 
Under the assumption that people prefer to associate with others who are similar 
to themselves, the model implies that for people who have a particular (binary) 
characteristic, there should be a concave relationship between the share of their  23
associates that have that characteristic and the share of the group that has that 
characteristic. For people who do not have that characteristic, the model implies that 
there should be a convex relationship between the share of their associates that have that 
characteristic and the share of group that does. The difference in the share of associates 
who have the characteristic between people with and without it will be hump-shaped. 
Intuitively, once a small number of people with a characteristic are introduced, the people 
who also have that characteristic will be able to have associates who are similar to 
themselves; people without the characteristic will not be forced to associate with people 
with it until most of the group has the characteristic. 
We test this hypothesis by regressing the share of peoples’ associates who have 
some exogenous binary characteristic, 
A
i x , on cubics in the share of the group who have 
the characteristic, 
G
i x , and these cubics interacted with the person’s value for the 
characteristic,  i x . We focus on race and ethnicity because of the strength of sorting on 
them (from Table 3).
13 Formally, we estimate, 
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The model also includes individual characteristics to control for the direct effect of 
characteristics on associations; interactions between the racial composition of the grade 
and the individual’s race (in case, for instance, the share of the grade that is white affects 
interactions between Asians and blacks); and school fixed effects interacted with the 
characteristic. Our estimates are identified from differences in the associations across 
students in different grades in the same school. 
The estimated polynomials, are reported in table 4. Figure 5 plots the implied  24
share of people’s associates with a given characteristic and the share of the group with 
that characteristic, with each point representing a single school-grade. (Echenique, Fryer, 
and Kaufman [2006] report similar results, but without school-grade fixed effects, 
obtained at the same time.) As expected, the difference in the relationship between 
people with and without the characteristics are globally concave. The curves for people 
with (own) and without (other) the characteristic generally indicate the expected 
relationships, especially in the regions with the greatest density. 
V. C. Macro-Group Size 
The model implies that large macro-groups facilitate sorting so that there should be a 
stronger relationship between individual characteristics and associates’ characteristics in 
large macro-groups.
14 To assess how school-grade size affects selective association, we 
estimate 
( ) i i
G




i SG x x X x N x x ε π γ θ β + Π + + + + = log *.  
Also included in the regression are individual characteristics (including the one being 
studied), interactions between the characteristic under investigation and the share of the 
school-grade with that characteristic, and a set of school-grade fixed effects. Our 
estimates are identified from differences in the strength of the relationship between own 
characteristics and those of associates across grades of varying sizes in the same school. 
Under the hypothesis that grade size facilitates selective sorting  0 > β . 
The estimates are reported in Table 5. For all of the characteristics (except father 
present), an increase in the size of the school-grade increases the relationship between 
own behavior or characteristics and those of associates. Thus, our estimates indicate that 
larger macro-groups do facilitate sorting. 
                                                                                                                                                 
13 Results are not reported for Indians because less than 3% of school-grades are 15% or more Indian. 
14 The mean and standard deviation of grade size are 236 and 126 (4.28 and .672 in logs) when weighted 
by students and 148 and 118 (4.427 and 1.427 in logs) when the data are un-weighted.  25
VI. Behaviors 
This section studies how endogenous association affects behavior. As indicated, 
one can not directly study the effect of sorting on endogenous variables in the same way 
as sorting on exogenous variables because endogenous variables may be affected by 
sorting. To address this concern, we employ a multi-step procedure in which we predict 
both individual and group behaviors using exogenous characteristics. We then study how 
changes in (predicted) behavior in a macro-group affects the behavior of people whose 
behavior is predicted to be high (or low) based on their characteristics. 
Formally, we begin by estimating the relationship between behaviors and 
exogenous individual characteristics, 
i i i i i SG X X y ε γ γ + Π + + =
2 2 1 1 . 
Here we have partitioned the matrix of characteristics,  i X , into two components, 
1
i X  and 
2
i X , where  [ ]
2 1
i i i X X X = . The model also includes school-grade fixed effects to control 
for the effect of macro-groups on behaviors. 
In our second step, we use the coefficients on the individual characteristics 
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ˆ  for  { } 2 , 1 ∈ j . 
We also estimate 
GHj
i y ˆ , the share of i’s macro-group that is expected to be above the 
mean of y based on characteristic set 
j X .  
VI. A. Sorting on Behaviors 
Endogenous sorting implies that the difference between people with high and low 
(predicted) behavior, in the share of associates with a high level of that behavior should  26
be concave in the share of the group with a high level of that behavior. To test this 
hypothesis, we regress the mean behavior of person i’s associates on interactions between 
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′ ˆ , and its square. Formally, we estimate, 
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1 ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ . 
As indicated, in the interactions between predicted individual and macro-group 
behaviors, we construct the predicted individual and macro-group components from the 
“opposite” components of characteristics. We do this because we have already shown 
that individuals sort on observable characteristics and we do not want our estimates of 
sorting on associations to be biased by sorting on exogenous characteristics.
15 We only 
include one set of interactions to avoid co-linearity. Our specification also includes 
school-grade fixed effects and individual characteristics, so our estimates are identified 
from differences in how the (predicted) behavior in a school grade affects people who 
(are predicted to) have high levels of an action relative to those who are not in the same 
school grade. 
Table 6 reports the estimates. As expected, the estimates show that the difference 
in the behaviors of the associates of people with high (predicted) behaviors relative to 
those with low (predicted) behaviors is concave in the share of the macro-group with 
high (predicted) behaviors. The linear term is positive and the quadratic is negative in 15 
of 19 cases and the two are statistically significant in 12 of the cases. (None of the 
                                                 
15 We have also regressed one set of predictions on the other and interacted the residuals. We split our 
characteristics into one set that comprises race and ethnicity and a second set that comprises family 
background and years at the school. The estimates reported use race and ethnicity to predict individual 
behavior and the other variables to predict macro-group behavior. Estimates that use race and ethnicity to  27
estimates where the signs are reversed are statistically significant.) Moreover, the two 
coefficients are frequently similar in magnitude, indicating that the difference in 
associations is greatest in groups where roughly equal numbers of people are predicted to 
be above and below the average behavior. As implied by endogenous association, we find 
that as the share of a macro-group with high (predicted) behavior increases, the mean 
behavior among the associates of people who (are predicted to) have a high level of that 
behavior increases relative to others initially and then declines as most of the macro-
group (is predicted) to have a high level of that behavior. 
VI. B. Reduced Form Behavioral Models 
If associations are endogenous and social interactions operate, the addition of 
people with high (predicted) behavior to a group that has a low (predicted) behavior will 
raise the behavior among people with high predicted behavior more than those with low 
predicted behavior. Once most of the group has a high (predicted) behavior, adding more 
people with high (predicted) behavior will affect people with low predicted behavior 
more than those with high predicted behavior. Thus, the difference in behavior between 
people whose characteristics imply high behavior relative to those whose characteristics 
imply low behavior should be hump-shaped in the share of the group with high predicted 
behavior. 
To test this hypothesis, we estimate a model that is similar to that above except 
we replace the mean behavior among associates as the dependent variable with the 
individual’s own behavior. Formally we estimate, 
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As above, the interactions between predicted own behavior and predicted group behavior 
                                                                                                                                                 
predict group behavior and other variables to predict individual behavior are broadly comparable.  28
come from different sets of characteristics and the model includes both sets of individual 
characteristics and school-grade fixed effects. These estimates can be thought of as 
reduced form estimates in a two stage least squares regression of individual behaviors on 
associates’ behaviors where interactions between predicted behaviors of the individual 
and the group are instruments for associates’ behaviors. 
Table 7 reports these estimates. As expected, we find that the difference in 
behaviors between those with high and low (predicted) behaviors is a concave function of 
and the share of the group with high (predicted) behaviors. Of the 19 estimates, 17 show 
the expected pattern (the other two are statistically insignificant) and 11 of the 17 are 
statistically significant. As above, the linear and quadratic terms are frequently similar in 
magnitude indicating that the difference in behavior peaks when roughly equal numbers 
of people (are predicted to) have high and low behaviors. Thus, our results for behaviors 
are consistent with social interactions with endogenous association. 
VI. C. Two Stage Least Squares Estimates 
As indicated, one can think of the two previous sets of estimates as the first stage 
and reduced form estimates of the effect of individual behaviors on associates’ behaviors 
where interactions between predicted behaviors of the individual and group are 
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and the first stage equation is 
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Here we include both sets of interactions between predicted own and group behavior in 
order to maximize the fit of our first stage equation. As above, the models include 
individual characteristics and school-grade fixed effects. Thus the estimates are identified  29
from differences between individuals with high predicted behavior relative to those with 
low predicted behavior in the effect of group composition. Because the first-stage models 
generate hump-shaped differences in associates’ behaviors, the identification comes from 
the non-monotonic relationship between group composition and the difference between 
people with high and low (predicted) behavior. 
The results are presented in Table 8. All of the estimates but one are positive and 
12 of the 19 are statistically significant. As expected the implied social effects are larger 
than those for the effect of macro-groups, but closer to estimates for people who are 
likely to associate with one another (Carrell, Fullerton, Gilchrist, and West [2006]).
16 
VII. Conclusion and Implications 
We have developed a model of social interactions with endogenous association. 
Our theory implies the standard, linear-in-means model of behavior, but departs from the 
standard model by assuming that people invest in developing relationships and that they 
do so in order to maximize their utility.  
At a policy level, the non-linearities and interactions that arise endogenously in 
the model imply that relocations of individuals can be positive or negative sum. Our 
finding of greater sorting in large macro-groups implies that relocations will be more 
effective when they are to small groups. 
Our model provides a novel explanation for the weak effects of housing 
relocation experiments. We hypothesize that people who are relocated into groups where 
many (but not all) people are different from themselves choose to associate with the 
people who are like themselves. Thus, we are reluctant to conclude from these 
experiments that people’s associates do not have large effects. 
At a policy level, our results suggest that relocation programs may be less 
effective than policies that increase the incentives for desired behaviors (e.g. rewards for  30
getting higher grades or more stiff penalties for crime). If endogenous effects are present, 
rewards will generate multipliers and because groups can be maintained, we expect less 




                                                                                                                                                 
16 The mean of the effects is .918 and the mean weighted by the inverse of the standard errors is .900.  31
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Figure 2. The Effect of Increasing Group Size. 
A. Active Associations  B. (Weighted) Mean Characteristics of 
Associates 
C. High-Low Difference in (Weighted) 
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Figure 3. The Effect of Group Composition on Actions with Uniformly Distributed Preference Shocks. 
A. Normally distributed unobserved preference shock. 







































































































































Note. The curves give mean behavior in the group (solid), among people with  1 − = x  (dotted), and  1 = x  (dashed). Solutions for  1 = β ,  1 = θ , 1 0 = t , 
5 . = α ,  {} 1 , 1 − ∈ x ,  {} 1 , 1 − ∈ y ,  5 . = c , and  4 = N . Bounds of shocks are -2 and 2. 40
Figure 4. The Effect of Group Composition on Actions with Normally Distributed Preference Shocks. 



















































































































































































































Note. In the first two figures, the curves give mean behavior in the group (solid), among people with  1 − = x  (dotted), and  1 = x  (dashed). In the third 
figure the curves give weighted mean of associates behavior for people with the high characteristic (dotted) the low characteristic (dashed) and the 
difference (solid). Solutions for  1 = β ,  1 = θ , 1 0 = t ,  5 . = α ,  { } 1 , 1 − ∈ x ,  { } 1 , 1 − ∈ y ,  5 . = c , and  4 = N . Shocks are distributed with mean of 0 and 
variance of 1. 41










































































































































Note. The own curve gives the share of the associates in the group for people who are in the group. The other curve gives the share of the associates 
in the group for people who are not in the group. The difference gives the difference between the own and other curves. Each point represents a 
school-grade. Plots generated from estimates in Table 4. 42
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics. 
  Own Behavior or Characteristic  Associates' Behavior or Characteristic   
  Mean Std. Dev.  Mean  Std. Dev.  N 
Grade - English  2.858 (0.962)  2.885  (0.641)  36,384 
Grade - Math  2.766 (1.002)  2.769  (0.667)  34,816 
Grade - History, Social Studies  2.926 (0.978)  2.940  (0.682)  31,551 
Grade - Science  2.860 (0.989)  2.877  (0.666)  32,379 
Smoke 4.368 (9.688)  4.538  (6.801)  41,555 
Drink Many Times  0.637 (0.481)  0.658  (0.301)  41,555 
Drink 1.764 (4.215)  1.959  (2.805)  41,555 
Get Drunk  0.993 (3.283)  1.152  (2.220)  41,555 
Trouble with Teachers  4.911 (8.777)  4.977  (5.111)  41,555 
Trouble Paying Attention  9.056 (10.405)  9.272  (5.964)  41,555 
Touble with Homework  8.730 (10.468)  8.865  (6.071)  41,555 
Trouble with Students  7.107 (10.664)  7.204  (6.366)  41,555 
Effort Studying (reverse coded)  1.817 (0.655)  1.837  (0.388)  41,555 
Race Bicycle  3.163 (7.530)  3.228  (4.475)  41,555 
Do Dangerous Things  1.282 (4.675)  1.437  (2.968)  41,555 
Lie 4.239 (7.758)  4.336  (4.620)  41,555 
Skip School  0.921 (3.607)  0.990  (2.389)  41,555 
Fight 1.181 (2.221)  1.215  (1.374)  41,555 
TV 1.878 (1.283)  1.816  (0.826)  41,555 
White 0.673 (0.469)  0.664  (0.396)  41,555 
Black 0.161 (0.367)  0.165  (0.332)  41,555 
Asian 0.068 (0.251)  0.068  (0.196)  41,555 
Indian 0.045 (0.208)  0.045  (0.118)  41,555 
Other Race  0.078 (0.268)  0.075  (0.172)  41,555 
Hispanic 0.149 (0.356)  0.152  (0.285)  41,247 
Mother's Education  13.641 (2.464)  16.679  (5.399)  34,721 
Mother Homemaker  0.178 (0.382)  0.176  (0.225)  36,943 
With Dad  0.785 (0.411)  0.791  (0.248)  41,059 
Age 15.730 (1.217)  15.745  (1.019)  41,543 
Male 0.460 (0.498)  0.465  (0.295)  41,539 
Note. Standard deviations of means in parentheses.  43
Table 2. Decomposition of Variance in Associates’ Behavior and Characteristics. 
  Full Sample  Neighborhood Sample 
 Between  Share
  N  Between Share  Between Share  N 
Grade - English  0.181  45,451  0.210  0.270  7,842 
Grade - Math  0.207  45,153  0.240  0.297  7,781 
Grade - History, Social Studies  0.166  44,388  0.181  0.242  7,666 
Grade - Science  0.170  44,625  0.220  0.278  7,664 
Smoke 0.086  46,314  0.148  0.212  7,966 
Drink many times  0.092  46,314  0.147  0.199  7,966 
Drink 0.056  46,314  0.096  0.154  7,966 
Get Drunk  0.050  46,314  0.083  0.139  7,966 
Trouble with Teacher  0.070  46,314  0.096  0.144  7,966 
Trouble paying Attention  0.046  46,314  0.089  0.141  7,966 
Trouble doing Homework  0.059  46,314  0.097  0.149  7,966 
Trouble with Students  0.100  46,314  0.117  0.173  7,966 
Effort Studying (reverse coded)  0.091  46,314  0.138  0.193  7,966 
Race 0.056  46,314  0.094  0.153  7,966 
Does Dangerous Things  0.046  46,314  0.079  0.150  7,966 
Lies 0.045  46,314  0.075  0.126  7,966 
Skips School  0.075  46,314  0.103  0.146  7,966 
Fights 0.063  46,314  0.087  0.150  7,966 
TV 0.233  46,314  0.288  0.349  7,966 
White 0.491  46,314  0.612  0.685  7,966 
Black 0.431  46,314  0.448  0.630  7,966 
Asian 0.350  46,314  0.387  0.461  7,966 
Indian 0.077  46,314  0.170  0.246  7,966 
Other Race  0.206  46,314  0.223  0.280  7,966 
Hispanic 0.459  45,955  0.508  0.561  7,910 
Mother's Education  0.243  45,278  0.251  0.323  7,797 
Mother Homemaker  0.081  45,659  0.114  0.177  7,867 
With Dad  0.130  46,240  0.148  0.227  7,951 
With Neighborhood Controls  No    No  Yes   
Effects (Main Models)  324    294  700   
Note. Between share gives the share of variance in associates between school-grades (or school-grades and school-neighborhoods in the last column).  44
The neighborhood characteristics are whether the block group is urban, percent black, percent living in poverty, the percent of the adult population 
without high school degrees, the percent unemployed, and the log of the median family income.  45
Table 3. Mean Associate Characteristics Related to Own Characteristics. 
  Full Sample  Neighborhood Sample 
White  0.235 (0.004) 0.217  (0.009) 0.210 (0.009) 
Black  0.572 (0.003) 0.577  (0.008) 0.522 (0.008) 
Asian  0.316 (0.003) 0.397  (0.008) 0.390 (0.008) 
Indian  0.033 (0.003) 0.044  (0.006) 0.043 (0.006) 
Hispanic  0.231 (0.004) 0.237  (0.009) 0.228 (0.009) 
Mother has some College  0.094 (0.003)  0.086  (0.008)  0.080 (0.008) 
Mother  Homemaker  0.018 (0.003) 0.013  (0.007) 0.013 (0.007) 
With  Dad  0.026 (0.003) 0.028  (0.007) 0.025 (0.007) 
N (Race Variables)  46,990  8,080  8,080 
N (Hispanic)  42,822  7,371  7,371 
N (Family Background)  36,942  6,350  6,350 
Full  Sample  Yes      
Neighborhood Sample      Yes  Yes 
With  Own*Neighborhood  Interactions       Yes 
Note. Standard errors reported in parentheses. Dependent variable is mean characteristic among associates. Each estimate is from a separate 
regression of the mean characteristics of associates on the individual’s own value of that characteristic. Estimates include individual characteristics 
(age, gender, Hispanic background, Hispanic background unknown, race dummy variables, years at school, years at school missing, mother’s 
education, mother’s education missing, mother is a homemaker, mother is a homemaker missing, dad present, and dad present missing) and school-
grade fixed effects. The neighborhood characteristics are whether the block group is urban, percent black, percent living in poverty, the percent of the 
adult population without high school degrees, the percent unemployed, and the log of the median family income. 
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Table 4. Associate Characteristics Related to own Characteristic Interacted with Mean in School-Grade. 
 
Group Share of 
School-Grade 
Group Share of 
School-Grade
2 
Group Share of 
School-Grade
3 
Person in Group * 
Group Share of 
School-Grade 
Person in Group * 
Group Share of 
School-Grade
2 
Person in Group * 
Group Share of 
School-Grade
3 
White 0.608  -0.926 0.849 0.220 -0.011 -0.305
 (0.230)  (0.476) (0.303) (0.303) (0.512) (0.325)
Black 0.380  -0.986 1.284 2.042 -3.269 1.207
 (0.100)  (0.316) (0.271) (0.271) (0.480) (0.359)
Asian 0.496  -0.826 0.999 1.392 -2.462 1.069
 (0.080)  (0.336) (0.388) (0.388) (0.769) (0.693)
Hispanic 0.580  -0.507 0.656 0.170 0.157 -0.748
 (0.102)  (0.454) (0.473) (0.473) (0.869) (0.731)
Note. Standard errors reported in parentheses. Each row represents a separate regression. Regressions for whites, blacks, and Asians contain 46,690 
observations. The regression for Hispanics contains 42,822 observations because people with missing Hispanic background were excluded. The 
dependent variable is the mean of each characteristic among associates. Estimates include individual characteristics (age, gender, Hispanic 
background, Hispanic background unknown, race dummy variables, years at school, years at school missing, mother’s education, mother’s education 
missing, mother is a homemaker, mother is a homemaker missing, dad present, and dad present missing), the racial (or ethnic) composition of the 
school-grade and interactions between race (or ethnic background) and the racial (or ethnic) composition of the school-grade and school dummy 
variables interacted with race (or Hispanic background).  47
Table 5. The Effect of Macro-Group Size on Sorting: Associates’ Characteristics Related to own Characteristics Interacted with Macro-Group Size. 
 
Own Characteristic * 
Log(School-Grade Size) 
White 0.0040 (0.0046) 
Black 0.0672 (0.0042) 
Asian 0.1382 (0.0049) 
Indian 0.0093 (0.0041) 
Hispanic 0.1089 (0.0054) 
Mother has some College  0.0056 (0.0022) 
Mother Homemaker  0.0230 (0.0045) 
With Dad  -0.0021 (0.0042) 
N (Race Variables)  46,990 
N (Hispanic)  42,822 
N (Family Background)  36,942 
School-Grade Effects  Yes 
Note. Standard errors reported in parentheses. The dependent variable is the mean of each characteristic among associates. Estimates are the 
coefficient on the interaction between own characteristics and the log of school-grade size. Estimates include individual characteristics (age, gender, 
Hispanic background, Hispanic background unknown, race dummy variables, years at school, years at school missing, mother’s education, mother’s 
education missing, mother is a homemaker, mother is a homemaker missing, dad present, and dad present missing), interactions between the 
composition of the school-grade and own characteristics, and school-grade fixed effects. 
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Table 6. Sorting on Behaviors: Associates’ Behaviors Related to Predicted own Behavior Interacted with Predicted Mean in School-Grade. 
Independent Variable: 
Own Behavior Predicted to be High * 
Share of School-Grade with Behavior 
Predicted to be High 
Own Behavior Predicted to be High * 
Share of School-Grade with Behavior 
Predicted to be High
2  Observations 
Grade - English  2.387 (0.398)  -2.032 (0.354)  33,758 
Grade - Math  1.203 (0.348)  -1.056 (0.315)  32,246 
Grade - History, Social Studies  2.121 (0.371)  -1.806 (0.333)  29,217 
Grade - Science  1.830 (0.404)  -1.579 (0.354)  30,001 
Smoke 8.525 (2.905)  -5.331 (3.273)  38,422 
Drink many times  -0.200 (0.154)  0.276 (0.173)  38,422 
Drink 3.055 (2.726)  -2.440 (2.531)  38,422 
Get Drunk  0.933 (1.903)  -1.603 (1.697)  38,422 
Trouble with Teacher  17.589 (3.009)  -18.766 (3.477)  38,422 
Trouble paying Attention  12.105 (3.771)  -12.166 (4.250)  38,422 
Trouble doing Homework  11.543 (3.436)  -10.263 (3.936)  38,422 
Trouble with Students  10.474 (3.222)  -9.778 (3.745)  38,422 
Effort Studying (reverse coded)  -0.299 (0.278)  0.190 (0.241)  38,422 
Race 6.594 (3.249)  -6.575 (2.826)  38,422 
Does Dangerous Things  -2.520 (2.377)  1.516 (1.976)  38,422 
Lies 5.831 (3.614)  -6.979 (3.825)  38,422 
Skips School  7.899 (1.916)  -9.928 (2.113)  38,422 
Fights -1.132 (0.945)  0.616 (0.794)  38,422 
TV 0.880 (0.376)  -1.007 (0.371)  38,422 
Note. Standard errors reported in parentheses. The dependent variable is the mean of each behavior among associates. Estimates are the coefficient 
on whether the person’s behavior is predicted to be above the population mean interacted with the share of the school-grade whose behavior is 
predicted to be above the population mean and its square. Own behaviors predicted from regressions of behaviors on race and ethnicity dummy 
variables; school-grade behaviors predicted from years at school, years at school missing, mother’s education, mother’s education missing, dad 
present, and dad present missing. Estimates include individual characteristics (age, gender, Hispanic background, Hispanic background unknown, 
race dummy variables, years at school, years at school missing, mother’s education, mother’s education missing, mother is a homemaker, mother is a 
homemaker missing, dad present, and dad present missing), and school-grade fixed-effects variables.  
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Table 7. Effect of Endogenous Association on Behavior: Own Behaviors Related to Predicted own Behavior Interacted with Predicted Mean in 
School-Grade. 
Independent Variable: 
Own Behavior Predicted to be High * 
Share of School-Grade with Behavior 
Predicted to be High 
Own Behavior Predicted to be High * 
Share of School-Grade with Behavior 
Predicted to be High
2 Observations 
Grade - English  2.363 (0.626)  -1.892 (0.557)  33,758 
Grade - Math  1.051 (0.559)  -0.752 (0.507)  32,246 
Grade - History, Social Studies  2.067 (0.555)  -1.541 (0.498)  29,217 
Grade - Science  0.965 (0.628)  -0.728 (0.551)  30,001 
Smoke 9.553 (4.257)  -4.991 (4.797)  38,422 
Drink many times  -0.563 (0.254)  0.541 (0.285)  38,422 
Drink 3.117 (4.080)  -1.490 (3.788)  38,422 
Get Drunk  3.129 (2.756)  -2.747 (2.457)  38,422 
Trouble with Teacher  23.548 (5.227)  -25.951 (6.038)  38,422 
Trouble paying Attention  18.231 (6.648)  -19.414 (7.493)  38,422 
Trouble doing Homework  13.209 (6.008)  -12.292 (6.882)  38,422 
Trouble with Students  15.307 (5.543)  -16.948 (6.443)  38,422 
Effort Studying (reverse coded)  1.169 (0.479)  -1.090 (0.415)  38,422 
Race 7.282 (5.490)  -8.496 (4.776)  38,422 
Does Dangerous Things  6.437 (3.686)  -4.227 (3.064)  38,422 
Lies 11.706 (6.136)  -12.510 (6.494)  38,422 
Skips School  1.630 (2.880)  -2.086 (3.177)  38,422 
Fights -0.209 (1.527)  0.949 (1.283)  38,422 
TV 1.026 (0.638)  -1.269 (0.630)  38,422 
Note. Standard errors reported in parentheses. The dependent variable is the individual’s behavior. Estimates are the coefficient on whether the 
person’s behavior is predicted to be above the population mean interacted with the share of the school-grade whose behavior is predicted to be above 
the population mean and its square. Own behaviors predicted from regressions of behaviors on race and ethnicity dummy variables; school-grade 
behaviors predicted from years at school, years at school missing, mother’s education, mother’s education missing, dad present, and dad present 
missing. Estimates include individual characteristics (age, gender, Hispanic background, Hispanic background unknown, race dummy variables, 
years at school, years at school missing, mother’s education, mother’s education missing, mother is a homemaker, mother is a homemaker missing, 
dad present, and dad present missing), and school-grade fixed effects variables.   50
Table 8. Two Stage Least Squares Estimate of Associates’ Social Effect. 
  Estimate (Std. Err.)  Observations 
Grade - English  1.209 (0.234)  33,758 
Grade - Math  0.791 (0.314)  32,246 
Grade - History, Social Studies  1.044 (0.184)  29,217 
Grade - Science  0.752 (0.235)  30,001 
Smoke 1.239 (0.099)  38,422 
Drink many times  0.716 (0.353)  38,422 
Drink 2.659 (1.353)  38,422 
Get Drunk  0.562 (0.598)  38,422 
Trouble with Teacher  1.204 (0.336)  38,422 
Trouble paying Attention  0.671 (0.396)  38,422 
Trouble doing Homework  1.009 (0.389)  38,422 
Trouble with Students  1.106 (0.420)  38,422 
Effort Studying (reverse coded)  -1.389 (1.390)  38,422 
Race 1.970 (0.780)  38,422 
Does Dangerous Things  0.527 (0.511)  38,422 
Lies 1.386 (0.750)  38,422 
Skips School  0.328 (0.252)  38,422 
Fights 0.364 (0.561)  38,422 
TV 1.285 (0.433)  38,422 
Note. Standard errors reported in parentheses. The dependent variable is the individual’s behavior. First-stage estimates reported in table 6; reduced 
form estimates reported in table 7. Estimates include individual characteristics (age, gender, Hispanic background, Hispanic background unknown, 
race dummy variables, years at school, years at school missing, mother’s education, mother’s education missing, mother is a homemaker, mother is a 
homemaker missing, dad present, and dad present missing), and school-grade fixed effects variables.   51
Appendix Table 1. Variable Descriptions. 
Variable Description  Coding 
 
At the most recent grading period, what was your grade in each of the 
following subjects?   
Grade - English    ...English / Language Arts 
4 (A); 3 (B); 2 (C) 1 (D or 
lower) 
Grade - Math    ...Mathematics  As above 
Grade - History, Social 
Studies    ...History/Social Studies  As above 
Grade - Science    ...Science  As above 
Drink many times  Have you had a drink of beer, wine, or liquor—not just a sip or a taste 
of someone else’s drink—more than two or three times in your life? 
0 (No); 1 (Yes) 
  During the past twelve months, how often did you:   
Smoke    ...smoke cigarettes?  0 (never); .5 (once or twice); 1 
(once a month or less); 2.5 (2 
or 3 days a month); 16 (3 to 5 
days aweek); 30 (nearly every 
day) 
Drink    ...drink beer, wine, or liquor  As above 
Get Drunk    ...get drunk?  As above 
Race    ...race on a bike, on a skateboard or roller blades, or in a boat or car?  As above 
Does Dangerous Things    ...do something dangerous because you were dared to?  As above 
Lies    ...lie to your parents or guardians?  As above 
Skips School    ...skip school without an excuse?  As above 
Fights  In the past year, how often have you gotten into a physical fight?  0 (never); 1.5 (1 or 2 times); 4 
(3 or 5 times); 6.5 (6 or 7 
times); 10 (more than 7 times) 
Effort Studying (reverse 
coded) 
In general, how hard do you try to do your school work well?  1 (I try very hard to do my 
best) to 4 (I never try at all)  52
Appendix Table 1. Variable Descriptions (Continued) 
Variable Description  Coding 
  Since school started this year, how often have you had trouble:   
Trouble with Teacher    ...getting along with your teachers?  0 (never); 1 (just a few times); 
4 (about once a week); 3.5 
(almost everyday); 30 (every 
day) 
Trouble paying Attention    ...paying attention in school?  As above 
Trouble doing Homework    ...getting your homework done?  As above 
Trouble with Students    ...getting along with other students?  As above 
TV 
Outside of school hours, about how much time do you spend watching 
television or video cassettes on an average school day? 
0 (none); .5 (less than 1 hour); 
1.5 (1 to 2 hours); 2.5 (3 to 4 
hours); 4.5 (more than 4 hours) 
 